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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Statement of the Case. 
This case arises from the termination of Cherri Nix (Nix) by Elmore County, State 
of Idaho (Elmore) from her employment with Elmore County. Nix asserts that 
she had a promised condition of her employment; the right to a pre-termination 
hearing mandated by the Elmore County Personnel Policy (ECPP). She was 
terminated without such a hearing. 
ii. Course of Proceedings Below. 
Nix filed a Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial on December 11, 2012 in the 
Elmore County District Court. The Answer was filed January 12, 2013. 
Thereafter Nix filed a motion for partial summary judgment January 23, 2013, 
which was denied by Order of the Court dated April 16, 2013. Elmore filed a 
motion for summary judgment June 25, 2013; on September 23, 2013, 
Defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted. This appeal followed. 
iii. Statement of the Facts. 
The facts are largely undisputed. Nix filed a brief supporting her motion for 
summary judgment containing a section entitled "Facts Undisputed". R. Vol.1, 
pp. 079-081. Elmore filed a statement of disputed facts which agreed that many 
undisputed facts existed. R. Vol.1, pp.116-118. A separate pleading, Response of 
Elmore to the Request for Admissions includes the following: 
[PLAINTIFF'S] First Request for Admission No. 1: Admit that Plaintiff did 
not sign any document approved and authorized by the Elmore County 
Commissioners, stating that she understood and/ or agreed that the 
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Elmore County Policy Manual was not a guarantee of any particular length 
or term of employment. 
[Defendant's] Response: Admit. 
Request for Admission No. 2. Admit that only an appointed, elected 
official of Elmore County or a politic body of such elected officials, has the 
authority to change or alter any provision of the Elmore County Personnel 
Policy attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 2013 as 
Exhibit A. 
Response: Admit. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 4. Admit that the Elmore County 
Commissioners did not by any specific ruling, decision or order state 
prior to June 2012 that Plaintiff was at the time of her termination on 
probation in accordance with that section of the ECPP entitled 
"Employee Classification, compensation and Benefits", sub-section B. 
Probationary Period; all as found on page 14 of the Elmore County 
Personnel Policy attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated March 
4, 2013 as Exhibit A. 
RESPONSE: Admit. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 5. Admit that Elmore County's 
Personnel Policy attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 
2013 as Exhibit A, can be changed only after notifying elected officials and 
· at the discretion of the Board of County Commissioners. 
RESPONSE: Admit. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 6. Admit that no [sic] neither Mr. 
Vence Parsons or any other supervisor of Plaintiff notified in writing, any 
elected official of Elmore County of any Elmore County personnel policy 
change regarding Plaintiff, prior to her termination of employment. If you 
deny this request, provide a copy of any such notification. 
RESPONSE: Admit. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 10. Admit that the Elmore County 
Personnel Policy attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 
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2013 as Exhibit A does not state in any provision thereof, that employees 
are at-will. 
RESPONSE: Admit. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 11 Admit that Plaintiff did not sign 
any agreement between her and the Elmore County Commissioners 
specifically stating that her employment could be terminated without 
cause at any time. 
RESPONSE: Admit. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. :13. Admit that the Elmore County 
Personnel Policy attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated 
March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A is the only policy document of Elmore 
County stating the reasons for which Plaintiff could be terminated 
and/ or discharged. 
RESPONSE: Admit. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 15. Admit that the Elmore County 
Personnel Policy attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 
2013 as Exhibit A does not state in any provision thereof, that employees 
may be terminated without cause. 
RESPONSE: Admit. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 16. Admit that the Elmore County 
Personnel Policy attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated 
March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A does not state that employees may be 
terminated at any time for reasons not stated in that document. 
RESPONSE: Admit. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 18. Admit that it is the contention of 
Elmore County in this case that unless Plaintiff was hired pursuant to a 
contract, her employment was at-will. 
RESPONSE: Admit 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 20. Admit that plaintiff was a full time 
employee of Elmore County at the time of her termination. 
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RESPONSE: Admit. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO, 21. Admit that plaintiffs probationary 
period ordered by her supervisor Vence Parsons on February 1, 2012 was 
for a disciplinary reason. 
RESPONSE: Admit. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 22. Admit that plaintiff successfully 
completed her first hire probationary period one year after the calendar 
year 2007 in which she was hired. 
RESPONSE: Admit. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 23. Admit that Vence Parsons was 
without authority to change, modify or establish any employment policy of 
Elmore County. 
RESPONSE: Admit only that Mr. Parsons is without authority to change, 
modify, or establish any employment policy of the Elmore County 
Personnel Policy. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 24. Admit that only the Elmore County 
Commissioners have the authority to change the terms and conditions of 
the Elmore County Personnel Policy attached to the affidavit of Barbara 
Steele dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A, which must be by an express 
writing. 
RESPONSE: Admit. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 27. Admit that Vence Parsons at no 
time between 2010 and this date, was an elected official of Elmore County. 
RESPONSE: Admit. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 28. Admit that Vence Parsons in 2012 
was at all times relevant to this action, an employee of Elmore County and 
subject to the Elmore County Personnel Policy attached to the affidavit of 
Barbara Steele dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A. 
RESPONSE: Admit. 
OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANT NIX 4 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 29. Admit that the Elmore County 
Personnel Policy attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 
2013 as Exhibit A contains no statement other than in the paragraph 
discussing the introductory period of employment, that employees can be 
discharged for any reason or at anytime, without cause. 
RESPONSE: Admit. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 32. Admit that Elmore County has 
represented to the United States District Court for the District of Idaho in 
Sommer v. Elmore County, et al Case 1:11-cv-00291-REB that: 
"The only limitation on the at-will employment relationship is that full-
time regular and part-time regular employees may request a pre-
deprivation appeal hearing before termination. This hearing is available to 
regular employees." 
RESPONSE: Admit that statement was made in that case, but deny 
Plaintif s characterization of the statement and use without full context. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 33. Admit that after serving her initial 
first-hire probationary period, Plaintiff was a full-time employee in 
accordance with the employee classification system provided by the 
Elmore County Personnel Policy attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele 
dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A. 
RESPONSE: Admit. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 34. Admit that the Elmore County 
Commissioners did not by an official act, change the employment status of 
Plaintiff from being a full-time employee, until date of her termination. 
RESPONSE: Admit. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 35. Admit that no act by an elected 
official of Elmore County changed the Elmore County Personnel Policy 
attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit 
A. regarding the classification of employees as full-time or otherwise, 
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between January 1, 2013 and the date of plaintiffs termination of 
employment. 
RESPONSE: Admit. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 36. Admit that employees placed on 
disciplinary probation as per the Elmore County Personnel Policy attached 
to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A are not 
automatically re-classified as not being full-time employees. 
RESPONSE: Admit. 
R. Vol.II, pp.357-365 
There was no disagreement as to statements in the affidavit supporting the 
Nix Motion for Summary Judgment that : 
1. The exhibits to the affidavit of Nix are copies of original documents. 
(Nix Affidavit Supporting Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.) R. 
Vol.1, pp. 029-031). 
2. That the facts stated in the exhibits to her affidavit were admissible as 
per Rule of Evidence 803. Elmore supplied a better copy of the 
Elmore County Personnel Policy found at R. Vol.1, pp. 165-193; an 
attachment to the affidavit of Barbara Steele, the Clerk of Elmore 
County. (R. Vol 1, pp. 157-158) 
1. Nix was employed from 2007 to 2012 by Elmore County as a janitorial 
employee. She had an initial period of probation as a new employee of 
six (6) months in 2007. Her probation ended in 2008. 
2. The Elmore County Personnel Policy manual was published and 
adopted by the County in 1999 and amended through February 13, 
2009. 
OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANT NIX 6 
3. No pre-termination hearing was held prior to the time that Nix was 
discharged. 
4. No "Notice of Proposed Action" was given to Nix. 
5. No hearing was provided whereat Nix could contest her termination. 
6. Kristina M. Schindele, Elmore County Prosecutor and counsel for the 
county advised the Elmore County Commissioners that none of the 
pre-termination procedures provided for in the Employee Manual 
applied to Nix. The Commissioners accordingly stated in the 
Termination Decision of June 18, 2012: 
"The ECPP provides that a permanent employee is entitled to "a 
hearing prior to any final decision on discharge, demotion with 
attendant change in pay or suspension without pay... On February 
1, 2012, when Ms. Nix was placed on probation for one year, there 
was no termination, demotion with attendant change in pay or 
suspension without pay ... At the time of Ms. Nix's termination, she 
was expressly an "at will" employee with the county. A 
probationary employee of the county is expressly an "at-will" 
employee. The ECPP (employment manual) states that the 
probationary period "shall be utilized for closely observing the 
employee's work... and for rejecting an introductory employee 
whose performance is not satisfactory... To construe that the ECPP 
creates anything other than an at-will" status for a probationary 
employee, or that the probationary employee is entitled to a hearing 
upon termination would render the probationa:ty employee concept 
meaningless under the ECPP." (Emphasis added) 
See, Decision on Termination dated June 18, 2012; Exhibit I; Nix 
Affidavit. R. Vol. 1, p.076. 
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On February 1, 2012 Nix was provided with a Notice of Disciplinary Action 
- Notice of Last Chance, which states Nix was on "probationary status" for 
a year, or until February 1, 2013. (R. Vol.1, pp. 033-039) On February 16, 
2012, Mr. Vence Parsons the supervisor of Nix, authored a note entitled 
"personal and confidential" stating that "you are not entitled to a hearing 
before the Elmore County Board of Commissioners pursuant to the Elmore 
County Personnel Policy. Therefore that request is also being denied." (R. 
Vol.1, p. 039.) As exhibits to the affidavit supporting her Motion for 
Summary Judgment Nix provided the trial court with copies of the relevant 
writings. (Note: The Exhibits named below attached to her affidavit which 
is found in the Clerk's Record at (R. Vol.1, pp. 030-031). 
They include the following: 
a. "At all times relevant to my employment Elmore County 
adopted and implemented the Elmore County Personnel, 
referenced by the county as the "ECPP". That reference is used 
in this affidavit. A true copy is attached hereto as Exhibit C. 
b. After the first six months of my employment I was subject to a 
probationary period as per page nine of the ECPP. Thereafter, I 
was a regular, full time permanent employee, not subject to 
probation as described in the ECPP. 
c. On April 30, 2012, I was given a Notice of Termination as an 
employee of Elmore County. A copy is attached as Exhibit D. 
d. The ECPP provides that prior to discharge I was to be given a 
"Notice of proposed Action" described under the paragraph 
entitled "Pre-Deprivation", page 20. I was not given any Notice 
of Proposed Action prior to the Notice of Termination, Exhibit 
D; I was given no list of charges against me. 
e. I requested a hearing before the Elmore Board of County 
Commissioners, which was set for hearing on June 11, 2012. See 
Exhibit E attached hereto. 
f. On May 24, 2012 my attorneys served on the Elmore County 
attorney a letter demanding a Notice of Proposed Action as per 
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the "pre-deprivation" section of the ECPP. See Exhibit F 
attached hereto. 
g. Elmore County sent to Plaintiff a Notice of Hearing. It states in 
part that: 
"Please be advised that you were an at-will employee, and as 
such are not entitled to a hearing regarding the reasons for your 
termination. The Board will discuss performance-related 
issues." See Exhibit G attached hereto. 
h. On June 7, 2012 the Elmore Prosecuting Attorney sent a letter to 
my attorneys stating that I was on probationary status subject to 
termination at any time and not entitled to the pre-deprivation 
procedures set out in the ECPP. See Exhibit H attached hereto. 
i. Elmore County Commissioners held a meeting on June 11, 2012 
and issued a written decision on June 18, 2012 confirming my 
termination. I was neither then nor since, ever given the pre-
deprivation rights and privileges, nor was I ever given a list of 
the charges against me; I was denied any hearing as to the 
reasons for my termination or an opportunity to response to any 
charges. See Exhibit I attached hereto. 
j. I have not been able to secure employment since the date of my 
termination on April 30, 2012. 
k. I was deprived of my vested rights to all the proper procedures 
prior to my termination by a contrived interpretation of what 
constitutes probation after the initial one year period; 
disciplinary probation is not new employment probation." 
(R. Vol.1, pp. 030-031) 
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ISSUES PRESENTED UPON APPEAL 
1. Did the covenant of good faith and fair dealing require a pre-termination hearing 
prior to the discharge of Nix as an employee of Elmore County? 
2. Did a supervisor employee of Elmore County have the authority to change the 
terms and conditions of the Employment Manual ? 
3. Did an agreement regarding employment terms including the right to a due 
process pre-termination hearing exist regardless of whether or not Nix was an 
employee at will? 
ARGUMENT 
The order granting Elmore summary judgment referenced the prior decision denying 
the summary judgment motion of Nix, stating that findings and conclusions were made 
therein that (1) Nix was an at-will employee; (2) Elmore County could end the 
employment relationship with Nix at any time without incurring liability; and (3) when 
Elmore County did end the employment relationship, it followed procedures set forth in 
the Elmore County Personnel Policy. (R. Vol.3, pp. 406-407). However, the trial court 
also noted that "The implied-at-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing in 
employment-at-will relationships covers "Any action by either party which violates, 
nullifies or significantly impairs any benefit of the employment contract is a violation of 
the implied-in-law covenant.' Metcalf v. Intermountain Gas Co., 116 Idaho 622, 627, 
778, P.2d 744,749 (1989)." 
Both parties filed motions for summary judgment which does not change the standard 
of review; evaluation of each party's motion on its own merits. Intermountain Forest 
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Mgmt.Inc. v. La.Pac. Corp. 136 Idaho 233, Borley v. Smith, 149 Idaho 171, 233 P.3d 102 
(2010). A jury was demanded by Nix. However, Nix concedes that the facts were to the 
extent necessary for adjudication established by the parties; the review is to determine if 
the district court properly granted judgment to Elmore as a matter of law. P.O. 
Ventures, Inc. V. Loucks Family Irrev.Trust, 144 Idaho 233,159 P.3d 870 (2007). 
The trial court's characterization of the probationary status given Nix by her 
supervisor on February 1, 2012 was error. The court reasoned that Nix's supervisor 
Vence Parsons had the lawful authority to change the employment agreement of Nix 
which he purported to do in the letter of February 12, 2012: 
"You are hereby notified that. . .it is my intention to impose the following 
discipline: ... 
4. You are placed on Probationary Status for a period of one (1) year. Your 
probation will run until February 1, 2013. You are, and remain, an at-will 
employee .... 
5. A failure to meet the goals set forth herein will subject you to termination at the 
conclusion of your year-long probationary period. A review of progress will be 
made with you throughout this year-long period. If progress is not evident, you 
may be subject to immediate termination at any time during the probationary 
period." 
(R. Vol.2, p. 231). 
The trial court agreed, ruling that Nix was on disciplinary probation which allowed 
her to be terminated without a pre-termination hearing: 
"Therefore, Plaintiff was a probationary employee subject to immediate 
termination when she was terminated on April 30, 2012. At the time of her 
termination, the Plaintiff was not a "full-time regular" or "part-time employee" 
under the provisions of the employment policy so the Elmore County Board of 
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County Commissioners was then not required to provide an appeal hearing prior 
to any final decision on discharge to comply with its policy on page 33 of Exhibit 
A to the Steele Affidavit." (R. Vol.II, p. 231). 
CHERRI NIX WAS NOT A NEW PROBATIONARY EMPLOYEE WHEN HER 
EMPLOYMENT WAS TERMINATED 
In various notices and documents Elmore stated Nix was not entitled to a hearing and 
other pre-termination procedures because she was on probation and not a regular 
employee: 
1. "Finally, you are not entitled to a hearing before the Elmore County Board of 
Commissioners pursuant to the Elmore County Personnel Policy. Therefore, that 
request is also being denied. " 
Februacy 16, 2012 Notice from Vence Parsons County Supervisor to Nix~ 
Nix Affidavit Exhibit B. R Vol.I, p.039. 
2. "You will also note that she was placed on probationary status as an at will 
employee subject to immediate termination at any time. Therefore, based upon 
prior notice to your client of her at-will status, the pre-deprivation procedures set 
out in the Personnel Policy do not apply to her. " 
Prosecuting Attorney Schindele's letter to Attorney Burgoyne, June 7, 2012. 
Nix Affidavit Exhibit H. R Vol.I, p.074. 
3. "Please be advised that you were an at will employee, and as such are not 
entitled to a hearing regarding the reasons for your termination. The Board will 
not discuss perlormance related issues " 
Commissioners Notice of Hearing June 11, 2012., Nix Affidavit Exhibit G. 
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R. Vol.I, p.073. 
4. "The ECPP provides that a permanent employee is entitled to "a hearing prior 
to any final decision on discharge, demotion with attendant change in pay, or 
suspension without pay." ...... On April 30, 2012 Elmore County terminated Ms. 
Nix's employment with the county as a Custodial and Maintenance Employee. At 
the time of Ms. Nix's termination she was a probationary employee with the 
county. A probationary employee of the county is expressly an "at-will" employee. 
The ECPP states that the probationary period "shall be utilized for closely 
observing the employees work... and for rejecting an introductory employee 
whose performance is not satisfactory." ECPP at p.9. To construe that the ECPP 
creates anything other than "at-will" status for a probationary employee, or that 
the probationary employee is entitled to a hearing on termination would render 
the probationary employee concept meaningless under the ECPP." 
Elmore County Decision June 18, 2012, Nix Affidavit Exhibit I. 
R Vol. I, p.076. 
"Probation" and "Probationary Status" are terms used in the "Notice of Disciplinary 
Action-Notice of Last Chance" dated February 1, 2012: 
"You are placed on Probationary Status for a period of one year. Your probation 
will run until February 1, 2012. You are and remain, an at-will employee." 
Notice of Disciplinary Action-Notice of Last Chance dated February 1, 2012. 
Nix Affidavit Exhibit A; R. Vol. 1, p.037. 
TWO CLASSIFICATIONS OF PROBATION ARE DEFINED 
Probation is addressed in two places in the ECPP manual. The section entitled Employee 
Classification, Compensation and Benefits" page 9 states: 
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"B. PROBATIONARY PERIOD 
The probationary period shall be regarded as an integral part of the selection 
process and shall be utilized for closely observing the employee's work, for 
securing the most effective adjustment of a new employee to his or her position 
and for rejecting an introductory employee who performance is not satisfactory. 
The probationary period will typically be a standard 90 to 180 days." 
Elmore County Personnel Policy, Page 9, Nix Affidavit Exhibit C. 
R Vol.I, pp. 040-067. 
The section entitled "Employee Discipline Procedures and Principles", pages 19 and 20 of 
the Manual states: 
"3. Levels of Disciplinary Actions Available. 
The Following actions include some but not all of the disciplinary steps which 
may be taken by the supervisor in response to personnel policy violations: 
a. Oral Warning. 
b. Written warning or reprimand. 




Nix was not an "introductory employee". She had been employed by Elmore County 
since 2007 and had been a full-time regular employee for five years. She was not on 
probation as a new employee for the "standard 90 to 180 days". Her probation when 
fired was one of the "disciplinary steps" taken by her supervisor Vence Parsons on 
February 1, 2012. 
The Manual states that regular full-time employees are entitled to the pre-termination 
hearing and procedures. Manual, Page 20. Obviously this meant Cherri Nix was so 
entitled unless "disciplinary probation" is the same as "introductory probation" of a new 
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employee. That is Elmore's position: all employees including Nix regardless of new or 
permanent status can be denied due process (a pre-termination hearing) by considering 
any probation as voiding the terms of employment with Elmore. That is clearly not how 
the manual reads, but how Elmore and the trial court so found. 
Such an interpretation is a contrivance. The Manual states that introductory probation 
is for a period of 90 to 180 days. Ms. Nix was placed on disciplinary probation for a 
period of one year. No language is found in the section of the ECPP entitled "Levels of 
Disciplinary Actions Available" which states that an employee placed on disciplinary 
status of probation is thereby a new or "introductory" employee. There are two distinct 
probations; the new employee probationary period during which no pre-termination 
hearing is required and disciplinary probation which is not an automatic conversion of 
the employee to new employment status. 
This is a unique question of document interpretation. However a case in point is 
McGraw v. City of Huntington Beach, 882 F2d 384 C.A.9 (Cal.) 1989. McGraw passed 
her probationary period a year after her first hire and thus attained the status of a 
permanent employee of the City as a Police Clerk. When she transferred to a different 
department she was advised that she had to serve another probationary period. 
Afterword, she was terminated. The attorney for the City of Huntington Beach cited the 
personnel manual for the proposition that a "probationary employee" could be rejected 
at any time without cause, with no right to appeal. The Court first observed that, 
" .. .It is very difficult to accept an argument that the City Council intended 
"permanent employee" status, once earned, to terminate sub silentio upon 
promotion, once again subjecting the promoted employee to the risks of what is 
essentially the "at-will" employment status of newly-hired probationary 
employees.,, 
The court concluded: 
"The question then arises whether appellant could have been both a "permanent" 
and a "probationary employee when she was terminated. We believe that it is 
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consistent with the Rules taken as a whole, and with the policies upon which the 
City's personnel system is based, to conclude that appellant was a "permanent 
employee" who was serving out a "promotional probationary period" in a position 
to which she had received a promotional appointment ... McGraw was not a mere 
probationary employee. She had successfully passed one period of probation in 
the HBPD, and attained "permanent employee" status in the City's competitive 
service. A permanent City employee who was subject, as was McGraw, to a 
promotional probationary period, moreover, could legitimately claim on the basis 
of the Personnel Rules promulgated by the City of Huntington Beach to have 
developed and retained reasonable expectations of continued employment, at 
least to continued employment in the position from which they had been 
promoted. We conclude that McGraw had a constitutionally protected property 
interest, and that absent an adequate defense or immunity, appellees deprived 
her of that property interest without due process of law. " 
Although the factual context here is different, the reasoning in McGraw is applicable. 
Nix was a full-time permanent employee of Elmore County in 2012. She was placed on 
disciplinary probation for one year. That action did not as the court in McGraw noted, 
silently terminate her full-time permanent status thus subjecting her to the risk of being 
terminated without cause the same as if she was a new hire. The reasoning of Elmore 
County was characterized in McGraw: 
"Appellees' argument also flies in the face of the well-established principle of 
statutory construction that every word, phrase, sentence, and part of a statutory 
enactment must be accorded significance and harmonized with every other part. 
DE Young, 147 Cal.App.3d at 17-18, 194 Cal.Rptr. at 725. Appellees' argument 
would read the "release" provision right out of the Personnel Rules. " 
That is precisely what occurred here. Full-time permanent employees have their due 
process right to a pre-termination hearing "read right out" of the Elmore County 
Personnel Policy if for a disciplinary reason they are placed on probation. 
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THE STATUS OF NIX AS AN AT-WILL EMPLOYEE WAS NOT CONTROLLING 
Elmore County ignores the plain language of the Personnel Policy: 
"The personnel policy of Elmore County establishes the right for full-time regular 
and part-time employees to a hearing prior to any final decision on discharge." 
In the same section, entitled "Appeal Hearing (Pre-Deprivation)" at page 20 of the 
manual are stated the "elements of procedure" for the hearing, which includes a notice 
of charges, a record to be maintained and the right to legal counsel: 
"The purpose of the hearing shall be to provide the employee an opportunity to 
present evidence and to rebut the information upon which the proposed 
personnel action is based." 
Nowhere in the Policy does it state disciplinary probation extinguishes the "established 
right" to a hearing: 
"When public employees have a protected property interest in their employment, 
the due process clause requires that, prior to termination, the employees be 
given: a) oral or written notice of the reason(s) for the termination, b) an 
explanation of the employer's evidence, and c) an opportunity to present their 
side of the story." 
Lubcke v. Boise City/Ada County Housing Authority, 1234 Idaho 450. 
Citing ,Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532. 
Nothing in the Elmore County Policy Manual provides that the Manual can be 
substantively changed by a supervisor; notice comes from the employer that the 
employment agreement is being uniformly changed to affect employees. Even where 
OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANT NIX 17 
there is no written agreement, a uniform reasonable notice of changes in employment 
agreements must be given by the Employer: 
"In the absence of a written agreement, this Court has held that an employer may 
unilaterally change the employment agreement by uniformly providing 
reasonable notice of the change to its affected employees; the employees accept 
by continuing to work following receipt of such notice. Watson v. Idaho Falls 
Consolidated Hospitals, Inc., 111 Idaho 44, 48,720 P.2d 632,636 (1986); Parker 
v. Boise Telco Fed. Credit Union, 129 Idaho 248, 254, 923 P.2d 493, 499 
(Ct.App.1996)". 
Bollinger v. Fall River Rural Electric Co-op, Inc.; 152 Idaho 632,272 P.3d 1263. 
Supervisor Vence Parsons had no authority to change the status of Nix to deprive her of 
an agreed-upon covenant, the right to a hearing; only the county commissioners have 
that authority; if they indeed desired to change the policies of the Manual for all county 
employees; Elmore County is the employer. There is no delegation of authority language 
in the Manual but exactly the opposite: 
"Only the Elmore County Board of Commissioners has authority to establish 
general policy for Elmore County Employees. The terms and conditions set forth 
in this policy, and in the resolutions and policy statements which support it, 
cannot be superseded by any other official's commitment, without the express 
written agreement of the Board of Commissioners. That is particularly true for 
terms and conditions that would establish a financial obligation for Elmore 
County now or in the future. It is important that all employees understand the 
relationship between policy adopted by the Board of Commissioners and 
department policy implemented by other elected officials." (emphasis added) 
Personnel Policy, page 7; exhibit A of Affidavit of Barbara Steele. R Vol.II, pp.157-200. 
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Nix as a full-time employee on disciplinary probation was vested with the right to a 
hearing prior to discharge. As stated in Wesco Auto Body Supply, Inc. u. Ernest, 149 
Idaho 881,243 P.3d 1069: 
"Idaho law recognizes a cause of action for breach of an implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing. Such a covenant is found in all employment agreements, 
including employment at will relationships." Cantwell v. City of Boise, 146 Idaho 
127, 135 P.3d205, 213 (2008). (Internal citation omitted). The determination of 
whether the covenant has been breached is an objective determination of whether 
the parties have acted in good faith in terms of enforcing the contractual 
provisions. Jenkins, 141 Idaho at 243, 108 P.3d at 390. "An action by one party 
that violates, qualifies or significantly impairs any benefit or right of the other 
party under an employment contract whether express or implied, violates the 
covenant." **1080 *892 Cantwell, 146 Idaho at 135-36, 191 P.3d at 213-14. 
However, the "covenant only arises in connection with the terms agreed to by the 
parties, and does not create new duties that are not inherent in the employment 
agreement." Van v. Portneuf Med. Ctr., 147 Idaho 552, 562, 212 P.3d 982, 992 
(2009)." 
Nix having employee status of being at will did not cancel out the covenant of 
good faith: 
"Idaho law recognizes a cause of action for breach of an implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing, which is found in all employment agreements, including 
at-will employment relationships. Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 233, 
242-43, 108 P.3d 380, 389-90 (2005). The covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing is a judicially created exception to the employment at-will doctrine based 
on a contractual duty of good faith." 
Crea v. FMC C01p.,135 Idaho 175, 179, 16 P.3d 272,276 (2000). Jenkins v. Boise 
Cascade Corp. 141 Idaho 233, 108 P.3d 380 (200s; Van v. Portneuf Medical 
Center, 147 Idaho 552,212 P.3d 982 (2009). 
OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANT NIX 19 
"Any action that violates, nullifies, or significantly impairs any benefit or right 
that either party has in the employment contract, whether express or implied, is a 
violation of the covenant. Metcalf v. Intermountain Gas Co., 116 Idaho 622, 627, 
778 P.2D 744 (1989). However, the covenant 'does not create a duty for the 
employer to terminate the at-will employee only for good cause.' The covenant 
simply requires that the parties perform in good faith the obligations imposed by 
their agreement. Jenkins, 141 Idaho at 243, 108 P.3d at 390 (citation omitted), 
(quoting Metcalf, 116 Idaho at 627, 778 P.2d at 749) (citing Thompson u. City of 
Idaho Falls, 126 Idaho 587,593,887 P.2d 1094, 1100 (Ct.App. 1994))." 
Prado v. Potlatch Corp. (U.S. District of Idaho 2006. WL 2597870). 
A cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is 
recognized in cases of at will employment. 
Metcalf v. Intermountain Gas Company, 116 Idaho 622, 778 P.2d 744 (1980); 
Sorensen v. Comm Tek, Jnc.118 Idaho 664, 799 P.2d 70 (1990); Wzllnerd u. Sybase, 
Inc. Dist.Court,D.Idaho 2011. (Refusing to extend the policy to convert at will into a 
contract of continued employment but recognizing the rule.) 
The Personnel Policy is unequivocal: full-time employees have the right to a Pre-
Deprivation hearing. The decision of the commissioners denying Nix a hearing was a 
violation of their own policy. 
Metcalf v. Intermountain Gas Co., u6 Idaho 622, 778 P.2d 744, 749 (1980); Mitchell, 
125 Idaho at 712, 874 P.2d at 523; Moser v. Coca-Cola Northwest Bottling Co., 129 
Idaho 708, 931 P.3d 1227 (1997); Idaho First National Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc. 
121 Idaho 266, 824 P.2d 841 (1991). 
CONCLUSION 
Elmore County admitted the accuracy of paragraph 13 of the Plaintiffs Statement of 
Undisputed Facts in support of her motion for summary judgment, which states : 
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"Elmore County Commissioners held a meeting on June 11, 2012 and issued a 
written decision on June 18, 2012 confirming Plaintiffs termination. She was 
never given any pre-deprivation procedure, or a list of the charges. Plaintiff was 
denied any hearing as to the reasons for her termination or an opportunity to 
respond to any charges against her." 
As a matter of law the termination of Cherri Nix was a wrongful discharge, in violation 
of her right to the agreed upon pre-termination hearing procedures. Upon remand she 
is entitled to back salary, attorney's fees and costs. The prevailing part in an action 
brought for breach of an employment contract is entitled to an award of fees under §12-
120(3); an employment contract constitutes a contract for the purchase or sale of 
service. Clark v. State Dept. of Health and Welfare, 134 Idaho 527, 5 P.3d 988 (2000); 
Atwood v. Western Const. Inc., 129 Idaho 234, 237, 923 P.2d 479, 482 (Ct.App.1996); 
Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 233, 108 P.3d 380 (2005). 
ATTORNEY FEES UPON APPEAL 
As per the authority above stated Appellant Nix respectfully requests that she be 
awarded reasonable attorneys fees and costs for this appeal; I.C. 1-120(3). 
DATED this :2!f_. day of June, 2014. 
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